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Health care 
advance 
directives: 
the next 
generation 
By Prof. Linda S. Whitton 
On july 1, 1994, Indiana joined the 
majority of states that permit their citi-
zens to declare in advance of incur-
able illness or injury what their prefer-
ences concerning artificially supplied 
nutrition and hydration would be in 
the event they cannot communicate 
those desires at the time of treatment. l 
Although these statutory amendments 
have provided a degree of flexibility 
previously missing under Indiana law, 
numerous unresolved statutory ambi-
guities and inadequacies continue to 
challenge Indiana practitioners who 
counsel clients on the use of health 
care advance directives. 
The purpose of this article is to high-
light common trouble areas in the 
drafting and implementation of health 
care directives and to assess the status 
of Indiana law in relationship to nation-
al developments in advance directive 
legislation. 
Directed, delegated and default 
decision-making 
Three primary classifications of legis-
lation for health care surrogate deci-
sion-making have developed in this 
country. The first, commonly known as 
living will legislation, provides for 
directed decision-making by empower-
ing individuals to declare in advance 
how they would like certain treatment 
decisions made if they later lose the 
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capacity to give or withhold contem-
poraneous consent. 
The second type, health care proxy 
and durable powers statutes, permits 
delegation of health care decision-mak-
ing authority to a representative or 
agent conditioned upon the delegating 
individual's loss of capacity to act on 
his or her own behalf. 
The third form of surrogate decision-
making legislation, often known as 
family consent laws, is a default mech-
anism that gives health care decision-
making authority to specified relatives 
of an individual who is incapable of 
giving consent and did not previously 
appoint a surrogate. 
Indiana has provided for all three 
types of surrogate decision-making 
through independent legislative enact-
ments. The Living Wills and Life-
Prolonging Procedures Act, which pro-
vides for directed decision-making/ 
and the Health Care Consent Act, 
which provides for both delegated de-
cision-making through appointment of 
a health care representative3 and 
default authority for health care con-
sent by family members,4 appear, as 
recodified, under Article 36 of Indiana 
Code Title 16. The Indiana Power of 
Attorney Act, which authorizes dur-
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able health care powers, is separately 
codified under Article 5 ofTitle 30.5 
Although it might be argued that a 
person who has qualified relatives 
under the family consent statute need 
not execute an advance health care 
directive, certain aspects of the family 
consent provisions should be consid-
ered before placing full reliance on 
default decision-making. 
Indiana's statute provides that health 
care consent may be given by a 
spouse, parent, adult child or adult sib-
ling,6 but gives no clear order of priori-
ty in the event that more than one 
family member is available to give con-
sent or there is a disagreement among 
qualified decision-makers. Further-
more, no provision is made for individ-
uals who lack relatives of the degree 
specified by statute, or who are unmar-
ried but live in non-traditional domes-
tic partnerships. 
A final concern with default decision-
making is the scope of authority afford-
ed family members. The Supreme 
Court of Indiana: has interpreted this 
scope to include decisions regarding 
artificial nutrition and hyd ration/ 
which may be broader than what an 
individual would have chosen if able 
to appoint a health care representative 
via an advance directive. 
Other states have tried a variety of 
legislative approaches to deal with the 
unsatisfactory aspects of family con-
sent statutes. These include setting a 
clear order of priority for default surro-
gate decision-makers,B as we ll as 
addressing disputes among classes of 
decision-makers, such as adult children 
or siblings, by requiring a majority9 or 
consensuslO decision. In the absence 
of consensus, the decision may then 
be referred to an ethics committee,,, 
or the dissenting surrogate decision-
makers may pursue guardianship pro-
ceedings.12 
Some states even provide for default 
surrogate decision-making by a "close 
friend" of the patient when higher-pri-
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ority family members are not 
available.13 All of these approaches are 
attempts at balancing the obvious ben-
efits of a flexible default health care 
consent mechanism with the need for 
safeguards of the significant interests 
at stake. 
Coordinating three statutes 
and documents 
Probably the best planning strategy 
for an individual who fears the uncer-
tainty of default provisions is careful 
delegation of health care authority to 
selected agents, and coordination of 
this delegation with a living will or life-
prolonging procedures declaration. A 
written health care directive is advanta-
geous because it can delegate priority 
decision-making authority to non-rela-
tives if preferred, and even when the 
preferred agents are family members, 
it can establish an order of priority 
among decision-makers as well as 
delineate the desired scope of authori-
ty. A health care advance directive can 
also be used to disqualify relatives who 
could otherwise give health care con-
sent in a default situation.14 
While delegating health care authori-
ty via a written directive would be 
preferable to relying on default provi-
sions for most individuals, the intrica-
cies of Indiana advance directive 
statutes may hinder the lay public's 
access to effective directives without 
the assistance of counsel. For example, 
a matter of confusion for both clients 
and practitioners is the distinction 
between appointment of a health care 
representative under Indiana Code 
§16-36-1 -7 and delegation of durable 
health care powers to an attorney-in-
fact under Indiana Code §§30-5-5-16 
and -1 7. Review of these statutes 
reveals that the powers under each are 
not coextensive. 
Indiana's current Power of Attorney 
Act was enacted subsequent to the 
provisions of the Health Care Consent 
Act and contemplates that a principal 
must properly execute and attach to a 
health care power of attorney the 
appointment of a health care represen-
tative if the attorney-in-fact is to have 
authority to consent to or refuse health 
care on the principal's behalf.15 
Furthermore, specific statutory lan-
guage contained in Indiana Code §30-
5-5-1 7 must be included in the 
appointment to convey authority to 
withdraw or withhold "health care," 
which under the Power of Attorney 
Act is defined to include "the provid-
ing of nutrition and hydration through 
intravenous, endotracheal or nasogas-
tric tubes."16 
Powers which may be conveyed 
through the power of attorney, inde-
pendent of the appointment of a 
health care representative, include: 
employing or contracting with ser-
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vants, companions or health care 
providers for the principal; admitting 
or releasing the principal from a hospi-
tal or health care facility; having access 
to medical records; making anatomical 
gifts; requesting an autopsy; and mak-
ing plans for disposition of the princi-
pal's body.17 
Thus, to achieve maximum flexibility 
and protection against guardianship, as 
well as the broadest surrogate health 
care authority allowed by law, the 
client needs both a health care repre-
sentative appointment and a health 
care durable power of attorney. 
Although the health care powers 
under the Health Care Consent Act 
and the Power of Attorney Act are not 
coextensive, the drafter of a durable 
power of attorney with accompanying 
health care representative appoint-
ment must be careful that both docu-
ments contain parallel provisions with 
respect to who is designated as the 
agent under each. 
The Power of Attorney Act specifical-
ly provides for appointment of a suc-
cessor attorney-in-fact,1B but the 
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Health Care Consent Act is silent on 
the issue of successors. Since one of 
the major reasons for executing 
advance directives is as a hedge 
against guardianship, prudent planning 
would suggest that a health care 
durable power of attorney name at 
least one successor attorney-in-fact, 
and that such appointment be paral-
leled by a successor health care repre-
sentative. 
Not only should the provisions of the 
health care representative appoint-
ment be carefully coordinated with 
those of the health care durable power 
of attorney, but potential conflicts with 
any statement of directed decision-
making - i.e., a living will or life-pro-
longing procedures declaration -
should also be assessed. 
An unanswered question under 
Indiana law is whether a living will or 
life-prolonging procedures declaration 
limits or pre-empts the authority of a 
health care representative who has 
been given the power to withdraw or 
withhold health care pursuant to the 
specified statutory language in Indiana 
Code §30-5-5-1 7. Consider the poten-
tial dilemma for a health care provider 
if presented with both a life-prolonging 
procedures declaration and a valid 
health care representative appoint-
ment containing the authority to with-
draw or withhold health care. 
The most recent amendments to the 
living will declaration make a limited 
attempt at avoiding this type of con-
flict by giving declarants the following 
choices concerning artificial nutrition 
and hydration: 
_ I w ish to receive artificially supplied 
nutrition and hydration, even if the effort 
to sustain life is futile or excessively bur-
densome to me. 
_I do not wish to receive artificially 
supplied nutrition and hydration, if the 
effort to sustain life is futile or excessively 
burdensome to me. 
_ I intentionally make no decision con-
cerning artificially supplied nutrition and 
hydration, leaving the decision to my 
health care representative appointed 
under I.C. 16-36-1-7 or my attorney-in-fact 
with health care powers under I.C. 30-5-
5.19 
Of course these choices do not 
cover other life-prolonging procedures, 
nor do they address the situation of a 
client who wishes to express a prefer-
ence regarding artificial nutrition and 
hydration in the event the health care 
representative is unavailable to act, but 
who in no way wishes to fetter the rep-
resentative's discretion to use his or 
her best judgment in unforeseen situa-
tions. 
The only solution at present to these 
potential conflicts is to include a state-
ment in the client's advance directive 
documents that clearly establishes or 
precludes any limiting effect of a living 
will or life-prolonging procedures dec-
laration on delegation of health care 
authority to a representative or attor-
ney-in-fact. 
Probl ems like the foregoing have 
prompted a number of states to 
replace piecemeal advance directive 
legislation with unified acts aimed at 
recognizing a single legal instrument to 
address both directed decision-making 
and delegation of surrogate health 
care authority.20 The National Confer-
june 1995 
ence of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Law has also adopted a compre-
hensive model act known as the Uni-
form Health-Care Decisions Act.21 
However, absent clarifying legislation 
in Indiana, practitioners are left the 
uneasy task of reconciling three sepa-
rate legislative acts, three documents, 
and a host of statutory ambiguities in 
order to translate a client's wishes into 
a comprehensive plan for directed and 
delegated health care decision-making. 
Although none of the advance direc-
tive statutes in Indiana requires docu-
ment preparation by legal counsel, as 
a practical matter the statutory scheme 
is antithetical to layperson-friendly 
applications. 
Access and implementation 
Access to advance directives is a par-
ticularly significant concern given the 
context in which the need usually aris-
es. When illness, injury or impending 
surgery precipitates the need for a 
health care directive, the person 
requiring treatment may not be able to 
visit an attorney's office or wait several 
days for document preparation. 
Notwithstanding the requirement of 
The Patient Self-Determination Act of 
199022 that all Medicare and Medicaid 
provider organizations inform patients 
of their respective state-law rights to 
formulate advance directives, hospital 
admissions personnel are usually not 
legally trained to explain the nuances 
of Indiana's health care directive laws. 
Hospitals may have fill-in-the-blank 
health ca re directive forms that pa-
tients can execute upon admission, 
but often these forms are outdated or 
offer less than the full range of legally 
available options for health care deci-
ion-making.23 Whether due to the dif-
iiculty of access or the emotionally 
unappealing nature of the task, it has 
been estimated that only 15 percent of 
mericans have executed any sort of 
Hitten health care directive.24 
(continued on page 22) 
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Even for individuals who have execut-
ed well-prepared advance directives, 
there are a number of impediments to 
effective implementation. One is 
notice to the appropriate health care 
providers that such documents exist. 
This is especially problematic in situa-
tions of emergency hospital admis-
sions. Hospitals may refuse to accept 
advance directives from an individual 
prior to an actual admission for treat-
ment, and a patient admitted on an 
emergency basis may be unconscious 
or in no condition to locate copies of 
the directives before being taken to 
the hospitai.2S To date, no workable 
central repository for health care direc-
tives has been established. However, 
several states have amended their dri-
ver's license statutes to provide notice 
of advance directives.26 
Another difficulty with implementa-
tion of valid health care directives is 
varying hospital policies regarding the 
withdrawal or withholding of life-pro-
longing procedures, especially artificial 
nutrition and hydration. Indiana law 
provides that an attending physician 
may refuse to honor a patient's living 
will or life-prolonging procedures dec-
laration, but must attempt to transfer 
the patient to another physician who 
will honor the declaration.27 
Because decisions to withdraw or 
withhold life-prolongi ng procedures 
usually occur in a hospital setting, the 
physician's willingness to honor an 
advance directive may be determined 
by hospital policy. Federal law requires 
that Medicaid and Medicare provider 
organizations not only provide wri tten 
information to adult individuals about 
their state-law rights to formulate 
advance directives, but that the organi-
zation also provide written information 
about the organizatio n's policies 
respectin g implementation of such 
rights.28 
Unfortunately this does not always 
happen in practice, or if in fact such 
written information is provided, a 
patient or the patient's health care rep-
resentative may not understand the full 
import of the information until treat-
ment such as artificial nutrition and 
hydration becomes an issue. In these 
situations, a patient may be subjected 
to unwanted life-prolonging proce-
dures pending transfer to a facility that 
will honor the advance directive. 
A similar problem may occur with 
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respect to emergency medical services 
(EMS) personnel and advance direc-
t ives. Absent legislation permitting 
EMS to fo llow advance directives 
requesting no resuscitation, EMS per-
sonnel are required to administer life-
saving treatment.29 Indiana has yet to 
address this problem legislatively, but 
20 other states now have "non-hospi-
tal, do-not-resuscitate" laws that apply 
to emergency medical services.3D For a 
terminally ill patient, unwanted inter-
vention by emergency medical person-
nel could create exactly the scenario 
that an advance directive was execut-
ed to avoid - that of placing the 
patient's family in the position of hav-
ing to request the removal of life sup-
port systems. 
Conclusion 
In some respects Indiana has been a 
forerunner in the field of advance 
directives, enacting legislation for 
directed, delegated and default surro-
gate decision-making. However, expe-
rience with attempting to coordinate 
these separately enacted laws into a 
comprehensive scheme for health care 
planning has revealed numerous prob-
lems and pitfalls. States nationwide are 
beginning to reassess their advance 
directive and family consent laws in 
order to make them more accessible 
and responsive to the needs of their 
citizenry. Perhaps it is time for Indiana 
to join these efforts to develop the 
next generation of health care advance 
directives. 
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